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1 Introduction
Following the Second Railway Package of the European Union, the Rail freight market
across the EU Member States and Switzerland is liberalized, adopting an open access
regime in each country. Since 2010, international passenger services is also open to com-
petition within the European Union as part of the Third Railway Package; the recent
Fourth Railway Package emphasizes the opening to competition of all rail services. These
decisions aim to foster this rail activity which represents a significant part of railways’ rev-
enues and market shares - more precisely, ten percent of railway undertakings’ passenger
turnover and twenty percent of international traffic. While international rail services face
a fierce competition from low-cost airlines, it is deemed that they would profit from the
enlargement of the European high-speed network and its interconnection if intramodal
competition is implemented. To do so, it is required that all Member States grant the
right of access to their rail infrastructure. Now, this policy raises in particular the ques-
tion of designing what could be the optimal organization of the European rail industry,
i.e., the industrial structure that would yield the highest level of consumer welfare. We
provide some insights on this key question by developing a model allowing explicitly for
an international (i.e., between countries) competition with the railway industry in the
background.
The traditional model of railway organization in Europe involves a single firm in
charge of both the fixed infrastructure, i.e., the network of rail tracks and its associated
equipment of signals and stations, and the operational services, which include rolling
stock management and all the transport services. More precisely, the firm is vertically
integrated. The main reason advanced to support this organization is that there is a need
for cooperation between the two layers.
Along these lines, a few econometric analysis of railroad cost functions document the
existence of cost complementarities between infrastructure and operations. Ivaldi and
McCullough (2001) manage to account for the vertical structure of railroads, which allow
them to evaluate the cross-elasticities between the infrastructure output and the different
service operations by fitting a translog cost function to a panel dataset of U.S. freight
railroads. A recent article by Ivaldi and McCullough (2008) tests for sub-additivity in
the cost function between infrastructure and freight operations. The results indicate that
firms running each activity separately would have up to 24 percent higher operational
costs than a vertically integrated firm. A study by Cantos (2001) undertakes a similar
approach to Ivaldi and McCullough (2001) for European services. Using a translog cost
function, the author analyzes economies of scope between infrastructure output and trans-
port operations (passenger and freight) for 12 major European railways along the 1973
-1990 period. The main finding is that the marginal cost of passenger output is increas-
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ing with the level of infrastructure value while the opposite result is obtained for freight
operations. Other evidence comes from Mizutani and Shoji (2001), who studied the case
of Kobe-Kosoku Railway in Japan. They found that vertically separated firms cost 5.6
percent more than an integrated system. Cantos et al (2010) and Mituzani and Uranishi
(2013) both show, however, that vertically separated firms tend to perform better than
integrated ones.1
These results just indicate that vertical disintegration might be costly from a technical
point of view. They must be balanced with gains that could be expected from managing
the rail infrastructure separately from the different rail service operations. In particular,
from a regulatory perspective, it could be more difficult for authorities to obtain the
information required for effective regulation of access than in the disintegrated case. With
separation, all firms that would enter the market are treated on an equal footing and
face the same rules of access. Moreover, it could be easier to compare productivity and
performance of the firms operating on the same track. Separation is viewed as a way to
foster competition to the benefit of customers. It remains that well-known advantages of
vertical integration are the diminished incentives for double marginalization and the better
coordination through the value chain. This is probably why the organization of railways
differs substantially across countries, ranging from complete separation (Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, the UK for instance) to strong integration
(the USA, passenger services in Japan, India and China for instance).
With these economic results and facts in mind, we question here the relevance of the
European reform of the international rail service. Indeed, most empirical and theoretical
analyses on the costs and benefits associated to integration do not consider international
services which require the use and access to several infrastructure networks. Our objective
is to shed light on both the working of competition and the optimal industry organization
for the international rail services, i.e., to provide a theoretical setup to understand and
illustrate the issues at stake. Incidentally, at this stage, we expect that this model would
draw directions for future empirical research.
In this perspective, we develop a model in which two (downstream) railroad operators
compete on a final market to provide transport services to end-users; since inter-modal
competition is also important, we assume that end-users could also travel by another
transport mode, which we take to road for instance. Our focus is on international trans-
port services, that is, transport services from one country to the other. Therefore, to
provide one unit of transport services, transport operators have to get access to both
1Shires et al. (1999a) compared the cost of the Swedish operator after a reform involving vertical
separation, and found that operating costs have been reduced by 10 percent. However, it is difficult to
know to what extent such reductions were due to vertical separation per se rather than to other aspects
of the reforms.
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infrastructures; the pricing of a given network is under the control of a country-specific
(upstream) infrastructure manager.
Our analysis emphasizes two elements: The nature of the returns-to-scale and the
nature of the final services provided by the transport operators. More precisely, we con-
sider that either the upstream segment (network) or the downstream segment (transport
operator) can exhibit some increasing or decreasing returns-to-scale. As we show in the
sequel, the optimal industry organization depends on these returns-to-scale, in particular
at the level of the upstream sector.
When the industry features downstream returns-to-scale only, then vertical integration
ought to be favored with respect to any other organizational choices which would imply
some form of separation. With upstream returns-to-scale, a somewhat similar conclusion
emerges: Integration (in both countries) dominates provided that the returns-to-scale
parameter is not too large; when it increases, a mixed industry organization, in which
one firm is integrated whereas the other is separated, becomes optimal; when it further
increases, separation in both countries becomes optimal.
In our working paper,2 we also consider the situation in which final transport services
are local only; that is, there are two national markets and railway operators are active
on both markets. The comparison between the case of international services and the
case of local services leads to the following conclusion. When the share of international
services becomes greater with respect to the total level of transport services, some kind
of separation tends to be preferred when the infrastructure is characterized by decreasing
returns-to-scale; integration would be optimal, by contrast, under increasing returns-to-
scale at the infrastructure level.
Concerning international services, whether it is for freight or passengers, the incum-
bents of different countries sometimes have cooperative agreements to provide combined
services whose revenues they share, based on some rule in a transparent way for the users.
Allowing the railroad operators to coordinate their pricing decisions on the final market
has the obvious drawback of increasing their market power.
Another option, much less discussed in the academic literature, is to allow some coor-
dination between national infrastructure managers. We compare the situations of vertical
integration or vertical separation in both countries with the situation in which both na-
tional infrastructure managers are merged into a single entity, called the transnational
infrastructure manager. The creation of a transnational infrastructure manager always
dominates the situation with vertical separation in both countries since the horizontal
externalities between the national access pricing decisions are now perfectly internalized.
The comparison with the case of vertical integration in both countries is less immediate:
2The paper is available from the authors upon request.
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Vertical integration allows to alleviate the double marginalization problem within each
country (a vertical externality is internalized) but the horizontal externality between na-
tional infrastructure managers remains; with a transnational infrastructure manager, the
horizontal externality is internalized, but not the vertical ones. With the specification
of our model, we found that the situation with a transnational infrastructure manager
always dominates any other industry organization. This result holds whatever the nature
of the returns-to-scale on the upstream and the downstream segment.
Our analysis departs from the traditional analysis of vertical integration by consider-
ing, first, increasing or decreasing returns-to-scale at the various segments of the industry,
and, second, final services which require the access to several networks whose access is
controlled by non-cooperative infrastructure managers. We build on Bassanini and Pouyet
(2005) and Agrell and Pouyet (2004). While these papers are more interested in the op-
timal regulation of the industry, we leave aside such issues and consider that regulatory
choices are limited to the decision to integrate or separate the industry. However, we
consider that railroad operators are imperfectly competitive, which seems a sensible as-
sumption in the railway industry. De Borger et al (2010) analyze the interaction between
various forms of competition (price or capacity) and the nature of the network (parallel
or serial), as well as the impact of tolling transit.
Section 2 introduces the notations, the setup and the basic ingredients of the model.
The main results of international competition are derived in Section 3. Then we discuss
the case for a transnational infrastructure manager in Section 4. We finally draw some
concluding remarks in Section 5. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Model
The basic setting we consider is the following. There are two countries, denoted by 1 and
2. In each country, there is an infrastructure manager in charge of the pricing of access
to the national railway network. Final customers have unit demands for (round-trip)
transport services from one country to the other and can use different transport modes.
Market for transport services. There are two railway operators, one in each country,
also denoted by 1 and 2 (the historical incumbent in country i is called ‘operator’ i), which
offer international transport services to final customers. These railway operators compete
in prices on the final market (that we describe below). Let pi be the price set by the
railway operator in country i = 1, 2 for one unit of transport service.
As inter-modal competition is important in the transport sector, we consider that
those railway operators face downstream competition by road. Let p0 be the price for one
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unit of transport service using road instead of either of the railway operators. Since road
transportation is carried out by many uncoordinated players, we assume that competition
between these players drives road price close to its marginal cost; hence, p0 stands for
the marginal cost of transportation.3 The vector of downstream prices is denoted by
p ≡ (p0, p1, p2).
In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we adopt the Hotelling-Salop model of price
competition with differentiated products. We assume that there is a unit mass of con-
sumers which is uniformly distributed around a unit circle. The two railway operators and
the ‘fictitious road actor’ are located symmetrically on this circle. A consumer located
at a given point x on the circle has a unit demand for transport services. To fulfill this
demand, the consumer can use the services of either the railway operators or the road
operator. The consumer’s utility when using the service of transport operator i is given
by u− pi − td(x, i) where u is the gross utility for the consumer associated to the trans-
port service,4 pi is the price paid to the transport operator i and td(x, i) is the so-called
‘transportation cost’ (which might be slightly misleading in the context of competition
between transport operators!): This cost stems, for instance, from the discrepancy be-
tween the services that the consumer located in x would ideally desire and the service
actually offered by transport operator i. Behind this modeling is the idea that transport
products are differentiated (both in terms of geographical convenience and in terms of
product lines) and final customers have heterogenous needs. The extent of the differen-
tiation between products is given by parameter t; the inverse of t, 1/t, characterizes the
intensity of competition between transport operators on the final market.
Let us now determine the pattern of demands. Suppose, for instance, that x is the
distance between the consumer and railway operator 1, and 1/3 − x is the distance to
transport operator 2. That consumer has three options: either he chooses railway operator
1 and gets a utility level u− p1 − tx, or he chooses the services of railway operator 2 and
earns a utility level u − p2 − t(1/3 − x), or, finally, he chooses road and obtains utility
u − p0 − min{1/3 + x; 2/3 − x}.5 For each consumer, we can characterize the optimal
choice of transport mode and, in the event the consumer chooses railway, the optimal
choice of railway operator. This allows to determine the following demand pattern:
Di(p) =
1
3
− 2pi − pj − pk
2t
,
3Moreover, to streamline the welfare analysis, we assume that road transport operators make no profit.
4Parameter u is assumed to be large enough in order to ensure that the market is fully covered in the
various configurations that we study later on.
5Around a circle there are two ways for a consumer to ‘travel’ until the points where the transport
operators are located. To minimize transportation costs, that consumer always chooses the path of
smallest length.
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for i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and i 6= j 6= k.
The transport operators. Since we consider international transport services, for each
unit of service provided to the customers, a transport operator has to get access to the
network of both countries. Hence, the profit of the railway operator in country i writes
as follows:6
pidi(p) = piDi(p)− Cd(Di(p))− (a1 + a2)Di(p),
where Di(p) is the final demand that addresses transport operator i when downstream
prices are given by p, Cd(Di(p)) is the cost associated to that level of final demand, and
ai is the unit access price set in country i. Since access to both networks is required to
complete one unit of final service, that transport operator pays access charges in both
countries.
The infrastructure managers. In each country, the pricing of the access to the railway
network is decided by an infrastructure manager. The profit of the infrastructure manager
in country i writes as follows:7,8
piui(ai, aj, p) = ai
∑
k=1,2
Dk(p)− Cu
(∑
k=1,2
Dk(p)
)
.
Indeed, since each unit of international transport services requires to use both national
infrastructures, the total quantity of transport services which uses the network in country
i is
∑
k=1,2Dk(p). The cost function associated to the management of the network is given
by Cu(.).
Regulatory choices. Our analysis assumes that both the upstream and the down-
stream segments are not regulated: Infrastructure managers, as well as railroad operators,
choose their prices in order to maximize their profits. Regulatory choices only bear on
the decision to integrate or separate vertically the industry.
Welfare. Total welfare is defined in our context as the sum of consumers’ surplus, the
railway operators’ and the infrastructure managers’ profits. As usual, consumers’ surplus
is defined as the gross utility minus the price and the transportation cost.
We will sometimes be interested in defining the welfare of a given country, say in
country i. In that case, we assume that half of the customers are part of country i’s
6Subscript ‘d’ stands for ‘downstream’.
7Fixed infrastructure costs play no role in our analysis and hence are omitted.
8Subscript ‘u’ stands for ‘upstream’.
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constituency, the remaining part belonging to the other country. Therefore, welfare in
country i is defined as half the total surplus of consumers, plus the profits of transport
operator i and of infrastructure manager i.9
The vertical and horizontal organization of the industry. In each country, we
shall consider the possibility of ‘vertical integration’ or ‘vertical separation’ between the
upstream infrastructure manager and the downstream network operator. Under vertical
separation in country i, the access price ai and the final price pi are decided so as to maxi-
mize the profit of the joint entity formed by the corresponding infrastructure manager and
railway operator. By contrast, under vertical separation in country i, the infrastructure
manager and the transport operator decides non-cooperatively ai and pi respectively.
The timing. The timing we consider goes as follows. In a first step, access prices are
decided. Then, in a second stage, railway operators choose their prices. Organization
choices, if any, are decided before the setting of access charges and final prices.
Figure 1 summarizes the main ingredients of our model.
p0
Road p0
RoadEnd-Users/Demand for international services
RO 1
Cd(q) = cdq + cddq
2
p1
RO 2
Cd(q) = cdq + cddq
2
p2
IM 1
Cu(q) = cuq+ cuuq
2
IM 2
Cu(q) = cuq+ cuuq
2
a1 a2
a1 a2
Country 1 Country 2
Figure 1: Structure of the model (‘IM’ stands for ‘infrastructure man-
ager’ and ‘RO’ stands for ’railway operator’).
9We feel confident that our results do not depend too strongly on the specification of the countries’
welfare.
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Cost functions and returns-to-scale. In order to assess the impact of the returns-
to-scale in the industry on the optimal organization of the railway sector, we use the
following specification:
• Cd(q) = cdq + cddq2, where cd is strictly positive (and sufficiently large to ensure
that the downstream marginal cost is positive) and cdd can be either positive or
negative. Therefore, cdd is an indicator of the nature of the returns-to-scale in the
downstream segment of the railway industry.
• Cu(q) = cuq+cuuq2, where cu is strictly positive (and sufficiently large to ensure that
the upstream marginal cost is positive) and cuu can be either positive or negative.
Therefore, cuu is an indicator of the nature of the returns-to-scale in the upstream
segment of the railway industry.
3 International competition
The timing of the game under consideration is the following. At the first stage of the
game, infrastructure managers choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively their access
charges. Then, at the second stage of the game, transport operators simultaneously and
non-cooperatively choose their final prices.
To ensure that the games we study are well-behaved, we maintain the assumption
that parameters are such that cdd/t ≥ −1/2 (respectively, cuu/t ≥ −1/2) in the case of
downstream returns-to-scale (respectively, upstream returns-to-scale).
3.1 The horizontal double marginalization problem
In this context, infrastructure managers generate externalities on each other. Indeed,
when deciding of the charge to access its network, an infrastructure manager does not take
into account the impact of such a decision on the profit of the network manager in the other
country. Since infrastructure managers offer complementary inputs to the downstream
sector (because a railroad operator must access both networks to provide international
transport services), this non-internalized externality typically results in excessive access
charges at equilibrium, which ultimately increases final prices. This externality is of a
different nature than the vertical double marginalization that we have emphasized in the
previous section.
Hence, when thinking about the optimal design of the industry, both the vertical
double marginalization problem (i.e., within a country between an infrastructure manager
and the downstream operators) as well as the horizontal double marginalization issue (i.e.,
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across national infrastructure managers) have to be accounted for. As we illustrate below,
this may change the relative merits of integration and separation.
Essentially three possible industry organizations are thus possible: both countries
choose vertical integration (denoted with an index ii), both countries choose vertical
separation (denoted with an index ss), or one country chooses integration and the other
chooses separation (denoted with an index is or si depending on which country decides
to integrate/separate).
3.2 Downstream returns-to-scale
Our first result concerns the optimal organization of the railway industry, among the three
possible ones.
Proposition 1. With international transport services and downstream returns-to-scale,
from the perspective both of the industry’s profit and of consumers’ surplus, it is optimal
to have vertical integration in both countries.
Proposition 1 shows that vertical integration in both countries ought to be favored
when only the downstream sector features returns-to-scale. Moreover, the nature (i.e.,
increasing or decreasing) of the returns-to-scale does not play a significant role in this
assessment.
In order to grasp some intuition about this result, let us compare the situation in
which both industries are integrated with the situation in which they are both sepa-
rated. Remind that, were the downstream sector perfectly competitive, integration would
be equivalent to separation whatever the nature of the downstream services (i.e., local
or international). Comparing the access and downstream prices under integration and
separation with international services, we obtain:
pii1 = p
ii
2 ≤ pss1 = pss2 and aii1 = aii2 ≥ ass1 = ass2 .
In words, with international services, integration leads to higher access prices but lower
final prices than separation. In our working paper, we show that with local services only,
downstream prices are lower under integration than under separation, but a reverse con-
clusion holds for the access prices. The conclusion immediately follows: with international
services, the horizontal double marginalization across infrastructure managers is exacer-
bated under integration, leading to excessive access price. However, under integration,
the vertical double marginalization is removed, leading ultimately to lower final prices.
A detailed comparison between the case of integration in both countries and the situ-
ation with integration in one country and separation in the other is not very illuminating
and bears some qualitative resemblance with the previous comparison.
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While the optimal organization is clearly defined in the presence of downstream
returns-to-scale only, one is left wondering whether countries or national industries will
manage to reach this socially desirable outcome if they can decide non-cooperatively of
the organization of their respective industries. We investigate this issue in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. With international transport services and downstream returns-to-scale,
suppose that, prior to the setting of access charges and final prices, each national indus-
try decides non-cooperatively integration or separation. Then, separation is a dominant
strategy and the unique Nash equilibrium features separation in both industries.
Proposition 2 shows that industries are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma when they
have to choose their internal organization. Indeed, we show in the Appendix that, for any
choice of organization made by industry j, industry i prefers to be vertically separated
as this allows to increase more the infrastructure’s profit than the reduction in the profit
made by the corresponding transport operator. These free-riding incentives push each
national industry to choose vertical separation, leading to a sub-optimal choice at the
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 also shows that delegating the choice of the industry’s organization to the
industry is probably not a good idea. One is left asking whether a national government,
which would be interested in its country’s welfare only, would choose the socially optimal
industry organization.
Proposition 3. With international transport services and downstream returns-to-scale,
suppose that, prior to the setting of access charges and final prices, each country decides
non-cooperatively integration or separation. Then, separation is a dominant strategy and
the unique Nash equilibrium features separation in both industries.
Proposition 3 highlights that the very same free-riding incentives that national indus-
tries have when choosing their vertical organization is present when countries, instead of
industries, have to make this decision.
3.3 Upstream returns-to-scale
We now tackle the same set of questions but under the assumptions that only the upstream
segment of the industry exhibits returns-to-scale.
As a first step, let us determine the optimal organization. It turns out that different
cases have to be considered depending on the value of cuu/t.
Proposition 4. With international transport services and upstream returns-to-scale:
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• From the perspective of the industry’s profit, integration in both countries is optimal
when cuu/t ≤ 1; otherwise, separation in both countries is optimal.
• From the perspective of consumers’ surplus, if cuu/t ≤ 0.30 (approximation), then
integration in both countries is optimal; if 0.30 ≤ cuu/t ≤ 1.65, then integration in
one country and separation in the other country is optimal; finally, when cuu/t ≥
1.65, separation in both countries is optimal.
• From the viewpoint of total welfare, if cuu/t ≤ 0.85, then integration in both countries
is optimal; if 0.85 ≤ cuu/t ≤ 1.05, then integration in one country and separation
in the other is optimal; finally, when cuu/t ≥ 1.05, separation in both countries is
optimal.
In order to understand the various forces at play in that case, we look at the impact of
the choice of organization on, first, the level of access prices, and, second, on the level of
final prices. Again, as in the case of downstream returns-to-scale, for conciseness we limit
our attention to the comparison between integration and separation in both countries.
Computations reveal that the total level of access charges paid, at equilibrium, by the
downstream sector (i.e., a1 +a2) is always larger under integration in both countries than
under separation in both countries:
aii1 + a
ii
2 ≥ ass1 + ass2 ⇔ cuu/t ≥ −0.377(approximation).
Therefore, integration in both countries tends to lead to larger access prices than separa-
tion when (competition-adjusted) returns-to-scale are decreasing or moderately increas-
ing.
Regarding the final prices, we obtain the following comparison:
pii1 + p
ii
2 ≥ pss1 + pss2 ⇔ cuu/t ≥ 1.
Hence, three zones of parameters seem to emerge. With sufficiently increasing returns-
to-scale, access prices are lower under integration and lead to lower final prices. Low access
prices indeed allow to reduce the horizontal double marginalization problem across infras-
tructure managers, and integration allows to reduce the vertical double marginalization
within each country. As a result, integration in both countries is the socially optimal
organization.
With moderate returns-to-scale, there is a tension. Access prices tend to be larger
under integration, but final prices tend to be smaller. For this range of parameters,
integration tends to be preferred by the industry, whereas consumers tend to prefer a
mixed regime in which one firm is integrated whereas the other is separated.
12
Finally, with sufficiently decreasing returns-to-scale, separation is preferred as this
leads to lower access and final prices.
We now focus on the industries’ incentives to choose integration or separation in a
non-cooperative way.
Proposition 5. With international transport services and upstream returns-to-scale, sup-
pose that, prior to the setting of access charges and final prices, each national industry
decides non-cooperatively either integration or separation. Then, the equilibrium is char-
acterized as follows:
• If cuu/t ≤ −0.25, then the equilibrium is unique and involves both industries choosing
integration.
• If −0.25 ≤ cuu/t ≤ −0.15, then there exist two asymmetric equilibria in which one
industry chooses integration whereas the other chooses separation.
• If cuu/t ≥ −0.15, then the equilibrium is unique and involves both industries choosing
separation.
Proposition 5 shows that, again, there remains some discrepancy between the private
and the social incentives towards the choice of organizations, although to a less dramatic
extent than in the case of downstream returns-to-scale.10 Indeed, in the case where cuu/t
is large enough (cuu/t ≥ 1.05), the Nash equilibrium in organization choices by national
industries coincide with the socially optimal choice, namely separation in both countries.
Similarly, when cuu/t is small enough (cuu/t ≤ −0.25), then the Nash equilibrium in
organization choices is integration in both countries, which coincides with the socially
optimal outcome. Otherwise, for values of cuu/t in between, private incentives are biased
towards excessive separation.
4 A transnational infrastructure manager
We now investigate the following scenario, whose relevance might be reinforced with the
development of international transport services: The management of the networks is del-
egated to a single infrastructure manager, which is kept separated from the downstream
railway operators. Clearly, the advantage of the creation of a such a unique transnational
infrastructure manager is to alleviate the horizontal double marginalization phenomenon,
i.e., the fact that national infrastructure managers do not account for the negative exter-
nalities they create on each other via their access pricing decisions.
10Qualitatively similar conclusions would be obtained had we assumed that the choice of integra-
tion/separation in a country is made by the government of that country.
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In the following, we shall compare this situation with a unique infrastructure manager
with other possible organizations studied in the previous section. Note that we do not
consider here the issue of the sustainability of such an organization since we consider only
the sum of the national industries’ profit or the sum of the countries’ welfare and leave
aside the issue of the sharing of the unique infrastructure manager’s profit across countries
or industries.
We obtain the following comparison.
Proposition 6. Whatever the nature of the returns-to-scale (either downstream or up-
stream), from the viewpoint of both the sum of the industries’ profit or the sum of the
countries’ welfare, the creation of a unique transnational infrastructure manager is al-
ways the best organizational choice.
This proposition shows that distortions arising from the horizontal double marginal-
ization are so important that getting rid of them, through the creation of a unique in-
frastructure manager, offsets any potential losses due to non-integrated vertical double
marginalization externalities.
We can qualify this result by introducing a slightly different model. Instead of assum-
ing that transport operators compete in prices on the final market, let us assume that
they compete in quantities. Denote by qi and qj the quantities set by railway operator
i and j respectively, and q = qi + qj. The (inverse) demand function is assumed to be
linear: P (Q) = α − βq. In this context, the strategic effects are profoundly modified
as quantities tend to be strategic substitutes in a Cournot framework. Nevertheless, we
can show11 that from the viewpoint of consumers’ surplus, the creation of a transnational
infrastructure manager always dominates separation in both countries (that is, whatever
the nature of the returns-to-scale). More interestingly, it also dominates integration in
both countries if and only if β2 − 4cuucdd ≥ 0. From the viewpoint of the industry profit,
no general lessons can be drawn unfortunately.
Again, costs and demands parameters are key to understanding the role of the vertical
organization of the industry. Note that the previous condition implies that, as long as one
segment of the industry features constant returns-to-scale, then a transnational infrastruc-
ture manager dominates integration in both countries. It would be worth investigating
whether other specifications of the nature of the competition between railroad operators
(i.e., Cournot or Bertrand with product differentiation) affect our results significantly or
not.
11The proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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5 Conclusion
The message conveyed in this paper can be summarized as follows. While the economic
literature has paid a great amount of attention to the pros and cons of vertical integra-
tion/separation in network industries, relatively little is known when, first, the upstream
as well as the downstream segments exhibit increasing or decreasing returns-to-scale and,
second, when the transport operators may require access to several networks. The need to
access several networks gives rise to a horizontal double marginalization problem since a
given infrastructure manager does not take into account the impact of its pricing decisions
on the profit of the other infrastructure manager.
The analysis undertaken here shows that, when the industry features downstream
returns-to-scale only, then vertical integration ought to be favored with respect to any
other organizational choices which would imply some form of separation. This holds true
whatever the nature of the final transport services, that is, whether we consider purely
local or purely international services.
With upstream returns-to-scale, the analysis becomes less clear-cut. With purely
international services, integration (in both countries) dominates provided that cuu/t is
not too large; when cuu/t increases, a mixed industry organization, in which one firm
is integrated whereas the other is separated, becomes optimal; when cuu/t continues to
increase, separation in both countries becomes optimal. A somewhat similar conclusion
emerges with local services only.
As an implication, when the share of international services becomes greater with re-
spect to the total level of transport services, our analysis argues that some kind of sep-
aration tends to be preferred.12 Importantly, note that the competitive environment,
embodied in parameter t, must be taken into account in such a reasoning: greater compe-
tition between transport operators (including our fictitious operator ‘road’) should tend
to favor integration over separation.
As argued at the end of the paper, our analysis bears on a archetypical model of
the railway industry. Clearly, one should not take too literally our conclusions based
on such a representation of the industry. However, the various effects (the two double
marginalization phenomena, the strategic effects associated to access pricing) are present
whatever the underlying theoretical model. An empirical validation appears to be the
next step of this analysis. Such a validation would necessitate to evaluate the nature of
the competition between transport operators, the nature of the returns-to-scale in the
various segments of the industry, and should be differentiated depending on whether we
consider local or international services. This is left for future research.
12In other words, the threshold of cuu/t below which integration is optimal is smaller when services are
international than when services are national.
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A Appendix
A.1 International competition
A.1.1 Downstream returns-to-scale
By analogy with the notations adopted in the previous sections, denote by Sii, Πiij and
W iij =
1
2
Sii + Πiij the surplus of consumers, the welfare and the industry profit in country
j when the industry is vertically integrated in both countries. Similar notations are used
for the other cases.
Comparing the cases of integration and separation in both countries, we obtain:
pii1 − pss1 =
(3cd+ 6cu − 3p0 − 2t)(16(cdd/t)2 + 30(cdd/t) + 15))
9(2(cdd/t) + 3)(22(cdd/t)2 + 57(cdd/t) + 33)
,
aii1 − ass1 =
(3cd + 6cu − 3p0 − 2t)(2(cdd/t)2 + 9(cdd/t) + 6)
9(22(cdd/t)2 + 57(cdd/t) + 33)
.
The former expression is negative whereas the latter is positive over the relevant range of
parameters.
Tedious computations lead to:
(
W ii1 +W
ii
2
)− (W ss1 +W ss2 ) ∝ [16(cdd/t)2 + 30(cdd/t) + 15],
× [160(cdd/t)3 + 718(cdd/t)2 + 1017(cdd/t) + 447],
which is always positive over the relevant range of values for cdd/t.
Moreover, we have:
(
Πii1 + Π
ii
2
)−(Πss1 + Πss2 ) ∝ 4(5(cdd/t) + 7)(2(cdd/t) + 3)2 +9(10(cdd/t) + 9)(34(cdd/t)
2 + 85(cdd/t) + 48)
(22(cdd/t) + 57(cdd/t) + 33)2
,
which is always positive over the relevant range of values for cdd/t. This concludes the
proof of Proposition 1.
Let us now focus on Proposition 3. After some cumbersome manipulations, and fo-
cusing on country 1 for instance, we obtain:
W ii1 −W si1 ∝− [12201984(cdd/t)9 + 115468800(cdd/t)8 + 487134400(cdd/t)7
+ 1202368896(cdd/t)
6 + 1912159632(cdd/t)
5 + 2029666128(cdd/t)
4
+ 1436101524(cdd/t)
3 + 652322736(cdd/t)
2 + 172413279(cdd/t) + 20184255],
which is negative over the relevant range of values for cdd/t.
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Similarly, we have:
W is1 −W ss1 ∝− [165888(cdd/t)7 + 1021824(cdd/t)6 + 2581904(cdd/t)5
+ 3410624(cdd/t)
4 + 2444184(cdd/t)
3 + 842664(cdd/t)
2 + 56385(cdd/t)− 26820],
which is negative over the relevant range of values for cdd/t.
Similarly, one can show that:
Πii1 − Πsi1 ∝
(10(cdd/t) + 9)(34(cdd/t)
2 + 85(cdd/t) + 48)
(22(cdd/t)2 + 57(cdd/t) + 33)2
− 8(48672(cdd/t)
5 + 238272(cdd/t)
4 + 461296(cdd/t)
3 + 442076(cdd/t)
2 + 209934(cdd/t)
4 + 39555)
(720(cdd/t)3 + 2396(cdd/t)2 + 2532(cdd/t) + 861)2
,
which is negative over the relevant range of parameters.
Moreover:
Πis1 − Πss1 ∝
(−5(cdd/t)− 7)
(2(cdd/t) + 3)2
+
36(6(cdd/t) + 5)(26(cdd/t) + 23)(108(cdd/t)
3 + 364(cdd/t)
2 + 387(cdd/t)
2 + 132)
(720(cdd/t)3 + 2396(cdd/t)2 + 2532(cdd/t)2 + 861)2
.
which is also negative over the relevant range of parameters.
This concludes the proofs of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7.
A.1.2 Upstream returns-to-scale
We obtain the following comparison:
aii1 + a
ii
2 − (ass1 + ass2 ) ∝
14(cuu/t)
2 + 53(cuu/t) + 18
3(8(cuu/t) + 9)(4(cuu/t)2 + 48(cuu/t) + 33)
,
which is positive for cuu/t ≥ −0.377.
Moreover:
pii1 + p
ii
2 ≥ (pss1 + pss2 )⇔ cuu/t ≥ 1.
Let now us focus first on Proposition 4. Straightforward but tedious computations
leads to the following (notations are identical to the ones adopted in the previous section):
(
W ii1 +W
ii
2
)− (W ss1 +W ss2 ) ∝ (−cuu/t+ 1)[116(cuu/t)2 + 627(cuu/t) + 447].
Therefore, integration in both countries dominates separation in both countries when
cuu/t ≤ 1.
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We also obtain:
(
W ii1 +W
ii
2
)− (W si1 +W si2 ) ∝3136(cuu/t)7 + 140944(cuu/t)6 + 626460(cuu/t)5
− 2851977(cuu/t)4 − 20377926(cuu/t)3 − 25883568(cuu/t)2
+ 16120566(cuu/t) + 19869165,
which is negative if and only if cuu/t ∈ [0.86; 5.22] (approximation).
Finally, we have:
(W ss1 +W
ss
2 )−
(
W si1 +W
si
2
) ∝3136(cuu/t)5 + 72736(cuu/t)4 + 425076(cuu/t)3
+ 657624(cuu/t)
2 − 510489(cuu/t)− 771615,
which is positive for cuu/t ≥ 1.05 (approximation) and negative otherwise (in the relevant
range of values for cuu/t.
As regards the access charges, we have:
(
aii1 + a
ii
2
)− (ass1 + ass2 ) = 2(3cd + 6cu − 3p0 − 2t)[14(cuu/t)2 + 53(cuu/t) + 18)3(8(cuu/t) + 9)[4(cuu/t)2 + 48(cuu/t) + 33] ,
which is always negative over the relevant range of values for cuu/t.
Let us now focus on Proposition 5. This proposition is obtained from the character-
ization of the industries’ incentives to integrate or separate non-cooperatively which are
described in the next Lemma.
Lemma 1. If one industry chooses integration, the other industry chooses integration if
and only if cuu
t
≤ −0.25.
If one industry chooses separation, the other industry chooses integration if and only
if cuu
t
≤ −0.15.
Indeed, computations unveils the following comparisons. First:
Πii1 − Πsi1 ∝
9(cuu/t+ 9)(2(cuu/t)
2 + 29cuu/t+ 24)
(4(cuu/t)2 + 48cuu/t+ 33)2
− 4(2352(cuu/t)
3 + 21128(cuu/t)
2 + 56763(cuu/t) + 39555)
(84(cuu/t)2 + 409(cuu/t) + 287)2
,
Πis1 − Πss1 ∝−
9(4cuu/t+ 7)
(8cuu/t+ 9)2
− 4(28(cuu/t) + 115)(28(cuu/t)
2 + 147(cuu/t) + 132)
(84(cuu/t)2 + 409(cuu/t) + 287)2
.
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Therefore, we have Πii1 ≥ Πsi1 ⇔ cuu/t ≤ −0.25 (approximation). Similarly, Πis1 ≥ Πss1 ⇔
cuu/t ≤ −0.15 (approximation). Proposition 5 immediately follows.
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